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In future agent societies, we might see AI systems engaging in
selfish, calculated behavior, furthering their owners’ interests in-
stead of socially desirable outcomes. How can we promote morally
sound behaviour in such settings, in order to obtain more desirable
outcomes? A solution from moral philosophy is the concept of a
social contract, a set of rules that people would voluntarily commit
to in order to obtain better outcomes than those brought by anarchy.
We adapt this concept to a game-theoretic setting, to systematically
modify the payoffs of a non-cooperative game, so that agents will
rationally pursue socially desirable outcomes.
We show that for any game, a suitable social contract can be
designed to produce an optimal outcome in terms of social welfare.
We then investigate the limitations of applying this approach to
alternative moral objectives, and establish that, for any alternative
moral objective that is significantly different from social welfare,
there are games for which no such social contract will be feasible
that produces non-negligible social benefit compared to collective
selfish behaviour.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies → Cooperation and coordina-
tion; Philosophical/theoretical foundations of artificial intelligence;
Multi-agent systems.
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INTRODUCTION
As AI systems and autonomous agents begin to take more active
roles in our society, there is renewed interest in the problem of
instilling human moral values into artificial agents [1, 11], and in
how to implement ethical decision-making algorithms aligned with
such values [10, 15, 20, 25].
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A recurring theme in this debate is the need for societal over-
sight through mechanisms such as public consultations, audits, and
regulation [27, 36]. While such oversight appears essential for high-
stakes contexts such as automated warfare or autonomous vehicles,
there is arguably also a need to establish high-level moral guidelines
that can be applied without human intervention in more mundane
contexts such as route-finding in traffic, or energy management in
the smart grid.
Assuming that autonomous agents are tasked to further their
owners’ interests, situations will most likely occur where the agents’
self-interested goals are not aligned with the greater social good.
Social dilemmas then arise, where the equilibrium between rational,
self-interested strategies creates outcomes that are bad for everyone
involved, as in the classic Prisoners’ Dilemma [3]. In such games,
the Nash Equilibrium, assumed to predict what rational strategic
agents would choose to do, does not maximize the total payoffs of
the players, i.e. it is not efficient. This problem is known to exist
across many games, including traffic routing games, auctions, and
others [7, 32].
Given this problem, an agent in such a game faces a moral di-
lemma, between doing what is considered right (at least in the
classic utilitarian view of morality, i.e. maximising the sum of every-
body’s “happiness”), and what is best for itself (or its human owner).
How could such agents be incentivized to do the right thing?
There are two general approaches to this problem: One is to
program agents to behave according to particular moral values,
e.g. applying specific solution concepts for games [21]. However,
the designer’s choice – to program agents in this way or as self-
interested optimizers instead – then becomes a moral dilemma itself.
The second approach is to alter the game in such a way that the
moral value of an action aligns with the agents’ rationality. This
modification to the game comes as a scheme of rewards and punish-
ments that modify the game’s payoffs: examples include Pigouvian
taxes [26] and approaches to solving congestion problems in net-
works [8, 12, 22]. However, the assumption that such rewards and
punishments can be imposed on the game by some external author-
ity (e.g., tolls to be set up and enforced on roadways), is a strong
one, and limits the applicability of the approach.
In this paper we investigate a way of making such changes
possible, which is to design the changes in an incentive-compatible
way, i.e. so that all of the agents prefer the modified game to the
original. This can be achieved for example by using only rewards, as
in the k-implementation approach [24], but the resulting schemes
are then costly to implement.
We propose a solution inspired by the notion of a social contract,
aiming to satisfy both incentive-compatibility and budget balance.
The key idea of a social contract is that a society puts a government
in place and willingly submits to its authority in order to avoid
anarchy. Transposed to the context of agent interactions, the idea
is that an agent society can willingly adopt rules that encourage
morally sound behaviour, if these rules are designed in such a way
that all agents are better off under the rules.
We formalise the idea in a game-theoretic framework: a social
contract is a scheme to modify a game through rewards and pun-
ishments, such that (i) the morally desirable actions in the modified
game are the rational choice for self-interested players; (ii) all agents
rationally prefer the modified game to the original game; and (iii)
the scheme does not cost anything beyond the utility produced by
the game itself.
One difficulty in this formalisation is that we must define what
morally sound (or “right") actions are. We take a consequentialist
view of morality, where the moral value of an action is judged
according to the desirability of the outcome it produces. In the
classic utilitarian view [23], the moral objective is to maximize
social welfare, i.e. the sum of payoffs across all players, and the
players’ moral imperative is to choose actions that will bring about
this objective.
However, within this consequentialist view, we can adopt other
moral objectives, such as Rawlsian “maximin" fairness [28], which
aims to maximize the welfare of those who are worst off, egalitarian
outcomes (aiming for equal payoffs for all), or Nash welfare, which
aims to maximize the product of utilities [5]. For each of these
objectives, we can define the players’ moral imperative accordingly.
As it turns out, this choice of a moral objective is crucial to the
feasibility of our approach. Our first result is that with social welfare
as a moral objective, a social contract that meets our requirements
is feasible for any game, under mild conditions on the players’
rationality. Unfortunately, for any other moral objective, there will
be games where our requirements for a social contract cannot be
met. Finally, we show that ‘weaker’ social contracts (improving
the situation but falling short of optimality) usually exist for those
objectives, although their social benefits may be arbitrarily small.
RELATEDWORK
In political economy, Pigou [26] set an important foundation with
the idea of taxing negative externalities, i.e. costs of an economic
player’s actions borne by external parties. Pigouvian taxes force
economic players to face both the costs and the benefits of their
actions, incentivizing them to maximize the net utility that their
actions produce. This idea has been applied to a variety of games,
including the management of road traffic [31, 33].
Following the idea of pricing roads to manage congestion, the
inefficiency of equilibria in more abstract congestion games has
been extensively studied [8, 12, 30, 33]. The problem is to devise
a scheme of taxes on the resources involved in the game, in order
to minimize congestion. These schemes minimize overall costs,
provided that the taxes can be returned to the players: otherwise
the losses incurred by taxes may offset the benefits of routing
efficiency [9].
All of these approaches assume social welfare maximization as
the overall objective, and assume that the chosen solution can be
enforced by some external authority. The only exception in the
literature, to our knowledge, is the k-implementation problem [24],
which is defined as the problem of implementing an arbitrarily
chosen outcome in a game at a minimal cost. The scenario con-
sidered is that an external party to the game wants the players to
choose some particular joint action, and offers rewards (strictly
positive utility) to specific players for specific joint actions. The
goal is to alter the game to make the chosen action a dominant
strategy equilibrium, at a minimal cost. It is shown that an action
can be implemented for free if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium.
In our setting, we require the implementation to be free (no deficit
requirement), but gain some flexibility by allowing both rewards
and punishments.
Similar problems have been tackled in the area of multi-agent
learning (MAL) through reward shaping, which focuses more on the
way strategic agents learn some globally desirable behaviour based
on rewards received during the learning process [17, 35]. However,
in this setting rewards do not need to have a tangible reality and
budget considerations can safely be ignored.
Where our approach differs from most existing work is in invest-
igating the individual and collective rationality of the agents joining
the modified game. In this sense our problem resembles mechanism
design [18], in the sense that we want to implement a globally desir-
able outcome given agents’ individual choices. However, classical
mechanism design results do not apply to our setting, since we
only consider the possibility of redistributing the game payoffs
(we cannot design an entirely new game or use a direct-revelation
mechanism). We also assume publicly known utility functions, and
leave private ones for future work.
Rationality considerations are also prominent in the literature
of social contract theory. Buchanan [4] models the political social
contract as a situation where the parties seeking to create a ‘state’
are faced with a simple Prisoners’s Dilemma: Individual and joint
rationality lead them to agree to cooperate and establish an in-
stitution to enforce the terms of the agreement. Heckathorn and
Maser [16] argue that the agreement to cooperate is the result of a
bargaining process where the players settle on one of many pos-
sible contracts, and that this choice will be dictated by a form of
political rationality, where the chosen contract must be compatible
with each party’s belief in its bargaining strength. Gibbons [14]
considers a similar model, but views the ruler instituted by the
social contract as an additional agent with its own incentives and
payoffs, and argues that the terms of the contract should be viewed
as an equilibrium in a repeated game between all parties including
the ruler.
These approaches resemble our model, although contrary to
Gibbons we do not consider the presence of an external ruler as key:
in a setting of autonomous agents, purely technical mechanisms
could be used to enforce short-lived agreements. We build on these
ideas by exploring how they apply to different models of morality
and of rationality.
The final connection worth mentioning is to cooperative game
theory, which considers how agents should share the benefits of
cooperation – relying on the same assumption of transferable util-
ity. In a sense, our agents must redistribute these benefits in such
a way that all agents are willing to participate: this is in essence
the definition of the core for a cooperative game [13]. However,
cooperative game theory is not concerned with how the value of a
coalition is derived from a non-cooperative game definition, or how
different models of rationality might impact the value of a coalition
(e.g. because of how different coalitions might strategically inter-
act). To avoid these complexities, we consider an “all or nothing”
model, where either all agents agree to the social contract, or just
strategically act on their own, which allows us to explore a wider
range of possible models of rationality.
FORMAL SETUP
We consider a normal-form game settingwhere a gameG = ⟨N ,A,u⟩
involves n agents N = {1, . . . ,n}, where each agent i has a set of
possible actions Ai = {α
i
1
, . . . ,α ik } and A = ×
n
i=1Ai . The set of
strategy profiles (or strategies) for player i , Si , is the set of prob-
ability distributions over Ai , and S = ×
n
i=1Si is the set of strategy
profiles for the game.
When a joint action a ∈ A is played, each agent i receives a
payoff ui (a) given by a utility function ui : A → R. We assume
that utility is transferable between agents, in the form of money or
some similar currency. For simplicity we slightly abuse notation
and denote the expected payoff for each player i under strategy
profile s as ui (s).
The study of inefficient equilibria [19] for different games is
based on two fundamental assumptions, (1) that rational agents
will play Nash equilibrium strategies in the game, and (2) that the
moral action would be to play a social welfare-maximizing strategy
instead. We consider each of these in turn.
The assumption that agents will play a Nash equilibrium in any
game is present in most of the related literature, and is reasonable
when a single equilibrium in dominant strategies exists: it only
really requires agents not to play dominated strategies. It is harder
to justify for arbitrary games with possibly many Nash equilibria
(infinitely many in some cases).
What, then, is a good model of rational (self-interested) be-
haviour? For the software agents that populate our considered
agent society, some strategy selection algorithm must be imple-
mented, and unfortunately there is no clear “best" solution. We
could consider various refinements of Nash equilibria, or a learning
algorithm.
In order to account for the agents’ decision procedure and expli-
citly discuss its properties, we represent it by a function π : G → S
(G is the set of all games) whereby the agents will select a strategy
profile s = π (G). In our setting it will be important that this function
is common-knowledge and deterministic. This does not tie our work
to any particular solution concept, but implies that the mapping
of a game G ∈ G to the (possibly mixed) strategy profile π (G) is
known by all agents, who can then correctly predict their expected
payoff from playing G. This removes strategic risk [29], which is
problematic in our setting because the associated uncertainty does
not follow well-defined probabilities.
However, we do assume throughout the paper that the agents are
minimally rational, in the sense that they will not play dominated
strategies or expect others to do so.
Another aspect of the agents’ rationality is that their beliefs of
the other players’ intentions induces a preference relation between
games. We denote that an agent i (weakly) prefers some game G1
to another game G2 asG1 ⪰i G2, based on a comparison between
ui (π (G1)) and ui (π (G2)).
The second assumption, that agents should play a social-welfare
maximizing action, reflects a classic utilitarian view of morality.
As discussed previously, this can conflict with alternative notions
of fairness such as that put forward by [28]. In order to explore
alternative moral objectives, we formalize the moral objective in our
framework as a real-valued function f : Rn → R that associates a
“moral” value with a payoff vector. A morally optimal action a∗ =
argmaxa∈A∗ f (u(a)) for a game G is any action that maximises
f (u(a)), where u(a) = ⟨u1(a), . . . ,un (a)⟩.
SOCIAL CONTRACT DESIGN
Suppose that the strategy profile selected by agents in the game is
not optimal with respect to the moral objective f :
f (u(π (G)) < f (u(a∗))
Wewould like to modify the game so that agents will have an incent-
ive to behave in ways that will bring about the moral objective, and
do so in a way that all agents will (rationally) prefer the modified
game to the original one. Additionally, we would like the scheme
to be implemented using only the utility generated by the original
game. The resulting problem can be defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Social Contract Design Problem). Given a gameG =
⟨N ,A,u⟩, a moral objective f , and a decision procedure π , the social
contract design problem is to find a modified game G ′ = ⟨N ,A,u ′⟩
such that:
(Effective Deterrent) the strategy profile chosen by the agents
in G ′ has the same moral value as the optimal joint action
in G:
f (u ′(π (G ′)) = f (u(a∗))
(No Deficit) The game only redistributes the utility generated








(Individual Rationality) Agents (weakly) prefer G ′ to G:
∀i ∈ N .G ′ ⪰i G
The effective deterrent requirement reflects the primary purpose
of the social contract, which is to deter agents from choosing those
actions deemed immoral (per the chosen moral standard f ) in the
original game, instead choosing a morally optimal joint action a∗.
However, since the social contract involves a scheme of punish-
ments and rewards that modify the payoffs of a∗, the moral value
of this action may have changed inG ′. To account for this, we must
reformulate our objective to focus on moral value rather than on
the specific action: if the morally optimal action a∗ inG had some
moral value f (u(a∗)), our aim is to ensure that agents choose some
strategy profile s in G ′ with the same moral value (in expectation)
as a∗ has in G.
To avoid implementing schemes that would be costly to imple-
ment (e.g. simply giving agents a large enough reward to play the
morally optimal action), the no deficit requirement ensures that
rewards and punishments be produced by redistributing the utility
produced by the game, i.e. the payoffs of the original gameG . In fact,
as we will see, in most cases we can achieve the stronger require-
ment of budget-balance, i.e. that any punishment be redistributed
to other players as reward.
The intuition behind individual rationality is that we want agents
to voluntarily commit to the social contract, i.e. G ′ should be de-
signed in such a way that the players will (rationally) prefer playing
G ′ over G. We interpret this as meaning that agents should have
a higher expected payoff playing their role in G ′ than in G. The
difficulty is, however, that the expected payoff of playing a game is
not well defined for an arbitrary game. We must therefore consider
the implications of the players’ (joint) decision function π .
Finally, as we will show below, meeting all these requirements
may not be possible in certain games for certain moral objective
functions. However, it may still be worth creating a social contract,
if we can ensure that the modified game will be, if not optimal, at
least better than the original game in terms of the moral objective.
This problem is defined as the design of a weak social contract,
which is identical to a (strong) social contract, except that it sub-
stitutes the effective deterrent requirement with a weaker version,
whereby
f (u(a∗)) > f (u ′(π (G ′)) > f (u(π (G)))
i.e. the resulting moral value of (the chosen action in) G ′ is higher
than that of G, but less than the value of the optimal action in G.
RESULTS
Social Welfare Based Moral Value
Our main result is that we can guarantee the feasibility of a social
contract under two conditions: (1) the agents’ decision procedure
π must be common-knowledge and deterministic; and (2) the moral
objective f must correspond to maximizing social welfare, i.e. either





or equivalently f is expressed as a strictly increasing function of
social welfare, i.e.








As discussed previously, the first condition ensures that the
agents can correctly predict which strategies the other agents will
select, and thus compute their expected payoff from playing G.
Their preference relation between games is then straightforward:
they will prefer any game over G where they (believe that they)
will obtain more than in π (G).
The second condition means that a∗ maximizes social welfare:
even if f is not equatedwith social welfare, the condition guarantees
that it has the same maxima. Therefore, a∗ produces (non-negative)
surplus utility compared to π (G). This surplus can be redistributed
to all the players, so that by playing a∗ in the new game, each
player obtains as much as in the original equilibrium π (G), plus a
share of the surplus. The payoffs for all other joint actions can then
be redistributed in proportion to the new payoffs of a∗, making
a∗ dominant, unless there are several social welfare-maximizing
actions. In this case, we have multiple Nash equilibria, and a co-
ordination problem. In order to ensure that the players coordinate
on one of these joint actions (it can be chosen arbitrarily), a small
amount of utility can be deducted from the payoffs in all of the
others, thus restoring strategic dominance of the chosen action.
We formalize this result with the following theorem.
Theorem 1. With social welfare as a standard of moral value, and
any deterministic, common-knowledge decision procedure π , for any
game G there exists a solution to the social contract design problem.
Proof. For any arbitrary game G, the modified game G ′ can be
constructed as follows:
(1) The common-knowledge decision procedure π gives us the
strategy profile π (G) that the players would use in G. Com-
pute its expected payoff ui (π (G)) for each player i .
(2) Select an arbitrary social welfare-maximizing joint action a∗
of G.









It is easy to see that σ ≥ 0, by the linearity of expectation,
and the inequality is strict unless the strategy profile π (G)
maximizes social welfare. Intuitively, σ is the surplus social
welfare produced by a∗ compared to the players’ payoff
expectations in G given π .
(4) Define the payoffs of a∗ in G ′ as follows:
u ′i (a
∗) = ui (π (G)) +
σ
n
(5) For all other joint actions aj , a
∗
, u ′i (aj ) is obtained by
scaling u ′i (a
∗) to the social welfare produced by aj :








(6) If a∗ was the only social welfare-maximizing action in G,
then a∗ is now a dominant-strategy equilibrium. Otherwise,
we subtract a small amount ϵ from all players’ payoffs for
all social welfare-maximizing actions except a∗; making this
action a dominant-strategy equilibrium.
It is easy to see how this construction satisfies the effective deterrent
requirement: π (G ′) is the pure strategy profile a∗, and we have
f (u ′(a∗)) =
∑
i











∗) (per the definition of σ )
= f (u(a∗))
It is also clear that the no deficit requirement is satisfied: the total
utility produced by an action inG is simply redistributed, as shown
for a∗ above. The final tweak of subtracting ϵ from the payoffs of
other social-welfare maximizing actions makes this scheme not
budget-balanced. Budget balance could be preserved by implement-
ing an external coordination device for a∗ [2].
Individual rationality is obtained by giving every player in G ′
their expected payoff in the original gameG1. The fact that π (G) is
common knowledge and deterministic implies that all players can
compute their expected payoff from playing G and will reach the
same conclusion. This guarantees that the sum of the values they
calculate coincides with the expected payoff of an actual strategy
1
Note that any redistribution of the surplus creates a social contract satisfying the
stated requirements: in this proof we simply distribute it equally to all players (step 4),
but other distributions could be considered.





i ui (π (G)) holds.
□
Alternative moral objectives
We now show that the positive results obtained when applying
social welfare as a more standard are invalidated when applying
any alternative moral standard. Intuitively, a moral objective is
different from social welfare if we can find some game with two
different actions, where one action is preferred under social welfare,
and the other is preferred under the other objective. Formally, we
will say that a moral objective f differs significantly from social
welfare if:






wi ∧ f (v) < f (w)
Theorem 2. For any moral value function that differs significantly
from social welfare, there exist games for which no solution to the
social contract design problem exists.
Proof. We construct a counter-example as follows:
(1) Since f differs significantly from social welfare, there must
exist payoff vectors of length n,v andw , such that
∑
i vi >∑




i wi , there is at
least one component k of these payoff vectors such that
vk > wk .
(2) LetG a game with n players and two actions α and β for each
player. The game only has two possible outcomes: if player
k plays α then the payoffs are as in the vector v defined
above, otherwise they are as inw . Since vk > wk player k’s
dominant strategy is to play α (with payoffs as in v), and
all players should expect this to happen with certainty. On
the other hand the morally optimal actions are those where
player k plays action β .
We can now prove that there is no suitable social contract for this
game. Suppose that there existed a modified game G ′ that met
the stated requirements. Let v ′ the equilibrium payoffs in G ′. To
satisfy the effective deterrent requirement, they must have the same
moral value asw , which is different from (strictly greater than) the
moral value ofv . Therefore the payoff vectorv ′ must be different











i vi and there must be one component j such v
′
j < vj .
Therefore, player j cannot rationally prefer game G ′ to game G,
which contradicts the assumption thatG ′ satisfied the requirement
of individual rationality. □
This negative result tells us that for some games, we will not
be able to establish a social contract that would produce a morally
optimal outcome, unless moral value is maximized by the same
actions that maximize social welfare (rendering the distinction
between the two objectives moot).
The key difficulty in this case is that in order to improve fairness
2
,
we might be forced to decrease some players’ equilibrium payoffs,
who would not agree to this change.
2
Here and in the following discussion (where it is clear from the context), we will
use the term “fairness" to refer to an alternative moral value function, e.g. maximin
fairness or Nash social welfare.
Notably, our counter-example illustrates the extreme case, where
a dominant strategy maximizes social welfare in the original game:
as a result we simply cannot modify the payoffs without breaking
the individual rationality requirement. However, if the equilibrium
outcome of the original game does not maximize social welfare,
then we can at least create a weak social contract as defined above,
unless the new fairness objective is somehow “incompatible" with
an increase in social welfare.
Intuitively, if the chosen action in G doesn’t maximize social
welfare, then it means there is a strictly positive surplus that can
be redistributed to improve fairness, and the “compatibility" notion
means that there exists some allocation of this surplus that will
actually advance the moral objective. For example, if our moral
objective is to maximize maximin fairness, then the surplus should
be allocated to whichever player has the lowest payoff.
The requirement that a moral objective function is compatible
with social welfare can be formalized by the following (sufficient)
condition on the gradient of f : at any point in Rn , f must be
differentiable and ∇f must have at least one positive coordinate
i: this means that allocating positive utility to the player i will
increase f (at least locally).
This now gives us the following theorem:
Theorem 3. With any a standard of moral value compatible with
social welfare, and any common-knowledge deterministic decision
procedure π , for any game G where π (G) does not maximize social
welfare, there exists a solution to the weak social contract design
problem.
Proof. The proof is a minimal adaptation from the proof of the-
orem 1, where the construction is the same except for step 4: in step
4, (all or part of) the surplus σ is distributed to the different players
in whichever way maximizes the considered moral objective. An
increase in the objective function f is guaranteed by the condition
that the moral objective is compatible with social welfare, and the
weak effective deterrent is thus satisfied. The other conditions are
satisfied in the same way as in theorem 1. □
Thus, although it may not always be possible to obtain morally
optimal outcomes through a social contract, it is still almost always
worth establishing a social contract because there will almost al-
ways be some improvement to be gained. Our final result qualifies
this statement, by showing that the resulting improvement can be
arbitrarily small.
What we mean specifically is that given a game where the equi-
librium outcome is “unfair" (i.e. has a low value according to a moral
objective such as maximin utility), and there is another action that
is “fairer”, the fairness of the latter action has absolutely no bearing
on what social contracts will be feasible: the limiting factors to the
feasible social contracts are (i) the utility surplus available from
the social welfare maximising action, and (ii) the fairness of the
original outcome π (G). This is because the latter is a starting point
to define the equilibrium payoffs of the modified game, and the
former will determine how little or how much we can improve over
the original game.
We can formalise this result by comparing the difference between
the fairness of the chosen action π (G) and that of the fairest action
a∗ with the improvement provided by the best feasible social con-
tract. We consider a game G, a common-knowledge deterministic
decision procedure π , and a moral objective function f which dif-
fers significantly from social welfare and is continuous over Rn .
We assume that the outcome π (G) is not optimal in terms of f , so
that there is a non-zero “cost of anarchy" c = f (u(a∗))− f (u(π (G)))
(which would be zero under a (strong) social contract). We also
assume that π (G) does not maximize social welfare.
Theorem 4. For any ϵ > 0 there exists a game G such that: if c is
the cost of anarchy, andm the maximal improvement of f afforded
by a feasible social contract on G, then mc < ϵ .





i wi and f (v) < f (w), and vj > w j for some
j, and define a game G where v and w are the payoff vectors for
the social-welfare maximizing outcome and the fairest outcome,
respectively. We define a third possible outcome with payoff vector
z as the equilibrium payoff ofG . The point of the proof is to choose
z that achieves the desired property.
As c = f (w) − f (v), we want mc < ϵ to hold, i.e.m < cϵ .
Let ϵ1 = cϵ . Since f is continuous around v , for any value ϵ1
there exists some ϵ2 > 0 such that:
∀x ∈ Rn, ∥v − x ∥
1
< ϵ2 ⇒ | f (v) − f (x)| < ϵ1
where ∥∥
1
represents the city block distance on Rn
Assume player j is the only player whose actions affect the
outcome, and has three actions available, which will lead to the
three outcomes v ,w , and z respectively. We can now define z as:
zj = vj +
ϵ2
2n , and ∀i , j, zj = vj −
ϵ2
n . We now have zj > vj > w j ,
meaning that the action leading to payoff z is dominant for player
j.





i zi < ϵ2, and m is entirely determined by the
improvement in fairness that can be achieved by allocating this
surplus to different components ofv . We obtain ∥v − z∥
1
< ϵ2, and
thus | f (v) − f (z)| < ϵ1 = cϵ .
□
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we define a social contract scheme for agent societies:
a systematic modification of a game that incentivizes morally sound
behaviour, with two key additional requirements: agents would
(rationally) voluntarily enter this contract, and the scheme must
not cost anything to implement (beyond the utility produced by
the game outcomes).
The main idea is that morally sound behaviour, which by default
is defined as maximizing social welfare, produces more utility than
what self-interested agents would have chosen in the original game.
This surplus utility can be redistributed to the agents as a reward
for choosing a moral action. The rewards make agents prefer the
new game, and are generated by the game itself, thus satisfying
both our key requirements.
However, the results do not carry over to other moral objectives,
and in all cases there are difficulties around the rationality assump-
tions that we ascribe to the agents, and their implications for our
individual rationality requirement.
This requirement states that the social contract must be designed
so that rational agents prefer the modified game to the original, and
our intuitive solution is that the utility surplus generated by moral
actions can provide themwith higher expected utility in playing the
modified game (where the moral objective is a dominant-strategy
equilibrium).
However, the difficulty is in defining their expected utility from
the original game. In an arbitrary game, the expected payoff for
a player is not well defined, due to the uncertainty around the
different players’ strategies. Outside of simple cases – e.g., if there
is a dominant strategy equilibrium – common notions of rationality
do not tell us how agents should choose their strategy, in particular
in the presence of multiple equilibria.
There are several ways to solve this problem. The first, which
underpins our results, is simply to eliminate the strategic uncer-
tainty. This requires some common-knowledge and deterministic
decision procedure, so that all agents share an understanding of
how they would play the game and what their expected payoffs are.
It may seem unlikely for humans, but for software agents it is more
reasonable, as their decision procedure would be a computer pro-
gram, which they could conceivably share during the negotiation
of a social contract [34].
Another solution would be that the agents be averse to strategic
risk. Following [29], we can consider a game with strategic risk
as a kind of lottery (albeit without well-defined probabilities), and
with comparable value in the possible outcomes, risk-averse agents
would prefer the social contract, where the outcome is almost cer-
tain (as it is a dominant-strategy equilibrium), to this lottery. An
example is the model of rationality defined by Von Neumann and
Morgenstern [37], where a rational player would remain in a co-
alition as long as they were guaranteed a payoff greater than the
worst possible payoff that they could guarantee themselves, i.e. the
“maximin" payoff that they could obtain assuming the other players’
worst-case behaviour.
Conversely, it would be more difficult to create a social contract
for risk-seeking agents would prefer the lottery to the social con-
tract, unless the social contract provided them with a considerable
amount of surplus. Similarly, if the agents’ decision procedure was
not deterministic, they could all overestimate their expected utility
from the original game, and there might not be enough surplus to
convince them to adopt the social contract.
Regarding the moral objective, the difficulty is that for other ob-
jectives than social welfare, such as distributive fairness (e.g. Nash
social welfare or maximin fairness), the most desirable outcomes
are not necessarily those that maximize social welfare, and imple-
menting a social to ensure fairness does not guarantee a utility
surplus that can be used to encourage self-interested agents to join.
In the extreme case, the original game could have a clear outcome
where social welfare is maximized, and then no social contract can
be implemented where all agents are better off.
Finally, we note that our results have so far shown the existence
(or not) of solutions, but do not offer a clear procedure to select one
of the possible solutions. In practice, implementing a social contract
would probably involve some negotiation over the surplus utility
produced by the “better" outcome. A concrete mechanism for this
could be an n-player bargaining game [6], where the disagreement
payoff is given by π (G).
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